Privacy Settings in Online Social Networks-Preferences, Perception, and Reality (Best Paper Award Nominee) by Netter, Michael et al.
Privacy Settings in Online Social Networks - 
Preferences, Perception, and Reality 
 
Michel Netter, Moritz Riesner, Michael Weber, Günther Pernul 
University of Regensburg 
{firstname.lastname}@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de 
 
 
Abstract 
To approach privacy threats stemming from interact-
ing with other users on Online Social Networks (OSN), 
effective Social Identity Management (SIdM) is a key 
requirement. SIdM refers to the deliberate and target-
ed disclosure of personal information to a subset of 
one’s contacts on OSN. Yet, unlike the physical world, 
SIdM on OSN is compromised by unavailable or insuf-
ficient settings as well as by properties of mediated 
communication (e.g. persistence). In this paper, we 
employ a novel approach based on the participants' 
Facebook profiles content to study privacy settings in 
OSN. Our results indicate a mismatch between per-
ceived, preferred, and actual settings that can be re-
duced to lack of awareness and control by the user.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Over the last decade, the evolution of the WWW 
led to a significant growth of Online Social Networks 
(OSN). While Social Networks have always been an 
important part of daily life, the advent of easy-to-use 
services and their ability to bridge spatial and temporal 
boundaries increasingly shifts social life to their online 
counterparts. Yet, the rise of OSN has also been ac-
companied by privacy concerns. While privacy con-
cerns can be directed at a number of stakeholders, such 
as the site operator, advertisers and third-party applica-
tions, this work focuses on privacy threats stemming 
from other contacts on OSN, a threat that has been 
pointed out by a number of publications [12, 17]. As 
OSN evolve to multipurpose platforms, where contacts 
from different social contexts are present [8], the prob-
lem of conflicting social spheres emerges [3], i.e. it 
becomes increasingly difficult to simultaneously meet 
the expectations of multiple audiences [17]. 
Similar to the real life, in which people act accord-
ing to the current context and depending on the people 
that are present, they require Social Identity Manage-
ment (SIdM) on OSN, referring to the deliberate and 
targeted disclosure of subsets of their personal attrib-
utes to selected online contacts [20], i.e. to be able to 
present different identity facets to different people and 
keep those facets consistent [9]. Although the majority 
of connections between OSN users is based on preex-
isting relationships of the real world [18, 5], applying 
the metaphor of a real-life conversation to information 
disclosure on OSN often leads to misconceptions, for 
instance, because information is not transient and its 
audience is greater than intended. As a result, for in-
stance a shared personal photograph can be seen by 
contacts who were not intended to have access (such as 
employers or colleagues), indicating a discrepancy 
between the actual disclosure setting on the OSN and 
perceived and intended settings. 
In this work, we operationalize privacy concerns 
stemming from interacting with other users on OSN by 
investigating discrepancies between the user’s intend-
ed, perceived and actual privacy settings on OSN in a 
novel way by using a customized questionnaire that is 
based on a Facebook-Application installed temporarily 
in the user’s profile. This provides the opportunity to 
inquire the participants’ perceived and expected disclo-
sure settings for actual items found in their profile. 
Further, we gather the items’ actual disclosure settings 
through the application to identify the user’s miscon-
ceptions and quantify potential mismatches. 
 
2. Related Work  
 
An often-cited definition of OSN and description of 
their history until 2007 is given in [6]. Several authors 
have voiced privacy concerns addressing personal in-
formation that is disclosed on OSN [10, 2], leading to 
suggestions for improving privacy settings and their 
presentation. Various surveys have been conducted on 
existing privacy controls on OSN in general [4] and for 
SIdM in particular [22]. 
The contribution of this paper consists of identify-
ing the perceived, desired and actual disclosure settings 
of OSN users and the discrepancies between them. The 
study is based on the assumption that survey respond-
ents' answers regarding perceived and desired settings 
are more correct when the questions are referring to 
actual profile-items. Thus, these data points were que-
ried for particular profile items in the participants' OSN 
accounts. To the best of our knowledge, no other work 
has examined all three aspects - perceived, desired and 
actual settings - on this level of granularity. 
There is a large body of work surveying the usage 
of OSN and their privacy settings in general, such as 
[5] and [11]. [7] investigates differences between pri-
vacy awareness and users’ behavior. Also, [13] and 
[23] analyze factors that predict more restrictive priva-
cy settings by the users. Further, in [1], a possible con-
nection between the users’ attitude towards privacy and 
their actual disclosure settings was investigated by 
comparing their answers to a questionnaire on the visi-
bility of their profile to the public on Facebook. Unlike 
our work, their questionnaire did not present actual 
profile items. Similarly, in [16] the participants’ in-
tended disclosure settings for a number of information 
categories were queried. Then, using a Facebook-
application, items of these categories were gathered to 
assess whether the actual disclosure settings corre-
sponded to the users’ intentions. Both [1] and [16] only 
feature broad disclosure settings and do not consider 
the disclosure to only a subset of the participants’ con-
tacts.  
Expected and actual disclosure settings for particu-
lar pictures of Facebook-users were surveyed in [15]. 
Regarding disclosure granularity, when investigating 
discrepancies between intended and actual settings, 
their analysis only considers the general setting some 
friends. In contrast, we analyze this discrepancy on the 
granularity of disclosure to a particular contact. Fur-
ther, we also consider the type of relationship with the 
contact. 
 
3. Conceptual Model and Research Ques-
tions  
 
Assuming that real-world SIdM strategies are ap-
plied to OSN [21], this work investigates possible dis-
parities when doing so by analyzing disclosure settings 
of items posted to OSN. Note that in the remainder we 
use the terms disclosure setting and visibility setting 
interchangeably. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual 
model of our research problem, by displaying three 
perspectives on the disclosure setting of a particular 
item of one study participant. An item’s disclosure 
setting governs which entities are eligible to view it 
and thus specifies its audience. Firstly, we consider the 
item’s actual disclosure setting, representing the cur-
rently active setting on the OSN. The perceived disclo-
sure setting refers to what the participant believes the 
current setting to be, while the intended disclosure set-
ting refers to what the setting should be in the opinion 
of the participant. The directed edges in Figure 1 repre-
sent possible influences between the three perspectives. 
In an ideal scenario, the actual disclosure settings are 
the same as the perceived and intended settings for 
each item. We expect discrepancies however, which 
can be explained as follows: Differences between the 
perceived and actual setting indicate a lack of aware-
ness by the user. Further, differences between intended 
and actual settings indicate a lack of control, which can 
occur either because the intended settings cannot be 
applied with reasonable effort (if the perceived settings 
match the actual settings) or because the user does not 
realize the need for the intended setting to be applied 
(due to lack of awareness). Likewise, a discrepancy 
between perceived and intended settings indicates the 
user’s realization that changes to the actual settings 
need to be made – or, if such a discrepancy persists 
that the settings cannot be applied with adequate effort.  
We investigate this potential lack of awareness and 
control for three different domains on OSN, namely 
default information spreading, active information shar-
ing, and past information availability.  
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Figure 1. Conceptualization of the research 
problem 
First, we investigate whether default information 
spreading of the physical world equates to the situation 
in OSN. In the former case, spreading depends on the 
situation the user is currently in which can easily be 
understood. For example, the audience is clearly de-
fined when having a private conversation in a restau-
rant with friends. On typical OSN, default settings are 
available for different personal data categories to con-
trol visibility. If left unchanged, visibility of this in-
formation as well as its distribution within the OSN 
follows the rules as conceived by the OSN service pro-
vider. In this domain, we investigate possible miscon-
ceptions between the user’s perceived, preferred and 
actual default settings for different data type catego-
ries. Particularly, we address the following two re-
search questions: 
 
• RQ1a: Are OSN users aware of default settings as 
set up by the OSN service providers? 
• RQ1b: Do the users’ preferred default settings 
differ from the actual default settings? 
 
The second domain investigates active information 
sharing on OSN. In real life, sharing is adapted to the 
social norms of the user’s different social contexts and 
targeted to people currently present. The equivalent on 
OSN is the access control model which is used for tar-
geted disclosure. In this paper we examine whether 
OSN users understand the access control model availa-
ble and are able to use it according to their wishes. In 
detail, we address the following research questions: 
 
• RQ2a: For shared items, do OSN users understand 
the visibility implications of an OSN access con-
trol model? 
• RQ2b: For shared items, do OSN users’ preferred 
visibility settings differ from the actual visibility 
setting? 
 
Lastly, we examine the misconceptions regarding 
past information availability on OSN. While infor-
mation transience is an inherent property of real-life 
communication, information is persistently stored on 
OSN to enable asynchronous communication. In this 
domain we investigate whether the users are aware of 
permanent storage of information shared on OSN and 
if this non-transiency is according to their preferences. 
In detail, we address the following research questions: 
 
• RQ3a: Are OSN users aware of the permanent 
availability of previously shared items? 
• RQ3b: Do OSN users wish to change the visibility 
settings of previously shared items? 
4. Methodology  
 
This section outlines our method for recruiting par-
ticipants and subsequently presents the overall study 
design and the design of each questionnaire in detail. 
 
4.1 Recruiting Methods 
 
Participants were recruited in three ways: through 
an announcement on the department’s website and Fa-
cebook page, through an announcement on the insti-
tute’s bulletin board, and through an e-mail announce-
ment asking for participation. To increase the incentive 
for participation, two 25 € Amazon gift cards were 
raffled in a lottery among all participants.  
 
4.2 Study Design 
 
To investigate the research questions presented in 
Section 3, the study relies on the participants’ Face-
book profile items. The study was delivered as a Face-
book-Application to gain access to the participants’ 
Facebook profiles via the provided API. Figure 2 de-
picts the course of the study as well as its main compo-
nents. After arriving at the study’s landing page, each 
participant was redirected to Facebook, asking him to 
log into his account and grant access to the study ap-
plication. If successful, the participant was redirected 
back to the study and asked to provide demographic 
information and classify a subset of his contacts (cf. 
Section 4.2.1). The survey itself consists of three cus-
tom questionnaires with each of them targeting one of 
the three domains introduced in Section 3. It is im-
portant to note that all data collected was immediately 
hashed and anonymized: personal items used in the 
questionnaires were never written to disk as we were 
only interested in the items’ visibility settings. At the 
end of the study, all information stored was presented 
to each participant for approval. 
 
 
Figure 2. Study design 
Despite the possibility to open the study to all Fa-
cebook users, we designed our study to required physi-
cal attendance of all participants. While the open study 
approach would have likely increased the number of 
participants, it might have been subject to intentional 
misentry and vandalism. The attendance approach al-
lowed us to conduct the survey in a controlled envi-
ronment and to give advice to the participants where 
necessary and thereby increase the quality of partici-
pant input. The study was conducted at a dedicated 
room of the department in groups of up to eight partic-
ipants between December 2011 and April 2012. Mini-
mum requirements were a Facebook account with at 
least 40 contacts and at least five user-generated items 
such as status posts or picture uploads. 
 
4.2.1 Preparatory Contact Classification 
 
In order to gain additional knowledge about the 
type of relationship participants had with some of their 
contacts, they were asked to classify a subset of their 
contacts into one of four predefined categories, namely 
Close Friends (CF), Close Acquaintances (CA), Loose 
Acquaintances (LA), and Respected Persons (RP) (such 
as parents and other persons of authority). For each 
category, a description (such as criteria of suitable con-
tacts) was displayed along with a dialog showing a list 
with names and profile pictures of all of the partici-
pant’s contacts. The participants were asked to assign 
five contacts to each of the first three categories and 
three contacts to the RP category. 
 
4.2.2 Default information spreading 
 
To examine the user’s awareness (RQ1a) and pref-
erences (RQ1b) regarding default visibility settings 
(corresponding to perceived and preferred settings in 
Figure 1), a custom pie chart like questionnaire was 
developed (see Figure 3)1. It allows a participant to 
easily express the visibility of different data categories. 
On Facebook, separate default visibility settings exist 
for ten different categories, namely: Contact Info, 
Name, Wall Posts, Networks, Profile Picture, Likes, 
Friendlist, Gender, Birthdate, and Other Profile Data2. 
Each wedge of the pie represents a single personal data 
type. It has five partitions, representing possible audi-
ences. The audience size increases from the innermost 
level outwards with the following partitions available: 
Me, Friends, Friends-of-Friends (FoF), All Facebook 
Users, and All Internet Users, whereas the next outer 
partition is a superset of all inner partitions (e.g. be-
sides all friends of the participant’s friends, FoF in-
cludes the audiences Me and Friends). Note that subset 
of friends is not available for default settings, because 
a newly created Facebook account does not contain 
any friendlists. The available privacy settings differ 
between each category. For example, profile picture 
and name can be accessed from All Internet Users, 
while for instance the loosest privacy setting (which 
Facebook confusingly labels public) for wall posts 
solely comprises All Facebook Users. 
To examine the participants’ awareness of default 
settings, participants were asked for what they thought 
is the default setting for each category. To indicate 
their choice, they were asked to click on the partition 
of the respective wedge representing the intended audi-
ence (resulting in a blue-colored background for the 
given partition and all inner partitions).  
We employed the same type of questionnaire to as-
sess the participants’ preferred default settings, asking 
them to express their preferred audiences for each data 
type. After finishing both questionnaires (targeting our 
research questions RQ1a and RQ1b), we compared the 
results to Facebook’s actual default visibility settings. 
                                                 
1Inspired by: http://www.mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/ 
2Other profile data comprises for instance place of birth and family 
members 
 
Figure 3. Developed pie chart questionnaire 
 
4.2.3 Active information sharing 
 
To assess the participant’s awareness (RQ2a) for 
the permissions granted to other users regarding shared 
information and the participant’s preferred permissions 
(RQ2b) for this information, a dynamic questionnaire 
based on the participants’ shared personal items was 
developed (see Figure 4). The upper part of the ques-
tionnaire shows a personal item. Items were chosen 
from the participants’ Facebook profile in the follow-
ing order and quantity: Three Wall Pictures, three Al-
bum Pictures, two Mobile Pictures, two Status Posts, 
and two Links. If fewer items were available for a cate-
gory, additional items from another category were cho-
sen based on the order outlined above. Status posts 
were required to have a minimal length of 150 charac-
ters to contain sufficient information. Pictures account 
for a large number of items (eight) in this study as pre-
vious studies show that they are most likely to contain 
sensitive, i.e. privacy-relevant information [15], while 
the remaining items are chosen equally from other cat-
egories. The lower part of Figure 4 contains a set of 15 
users. The set of users consists of three randomly cho-
sen users from each of the categories of the pre-
classified contacts (see Section 4.2.1) as well as three 
randomly chosen strangers. Unlike [15], we opted only 
for a subset of the participant’s contacts because an-
swering the question for all contacts would be too time 
consuming and might have a negative impact on the 
quality of the survey results. Also we chose not to pro-
vide the participant’s existing friendlists as a choice to 
avoid bias. To assess the participants’ awareness, they 
were asked to select those contacts that, in their opin-
ion, have access to the shown item. Internally, the in-
put was compared to the actual access rights for this 
item. The same questionnaire was employed to assess 
the participants’ preferred visibility settings. 
 
 
Figure 4. Information sharing questionnaire 
 
4.2.4 Past information availability 
 
In order to investigate the participants’ perceived 
availability (RQ3a) of items they shared previously and 
to find out their intended visibility settings (RQ3b) of 
these items, older items (i.e. items shared at least one 
year ago) were shown to the participants. It can be as-
sumed that people in general know that information 
shared on OSN is persistently stored. Yet, this analysis 
examines a potential lack of awareness of permanent 
availability for particular items rather than general 
awareness of persistence on OSN. A five point Likert 
scale was used to state the level of surprise with the 
following options available: very surprised, surprised, 
have no opinion, are a little surprised, and not sur-
prised. If (very) surprised, the participants were asked 
to explain whether the surprise was due to absence of 
memory or due to changes in their personality for in-
stance caused by growing up or changing their self-
conception. Subsequently, participants were asked to 
state whether the item should still be available in the 
future. As for the previous questionnaire, items were 
chosen from the participants’ profiles in the following 
order and quantity: Three Wall Pictures, three Album 
Pictures, two Mobile Pictures, two Status Posts, and 
two Links. If fewer items were available for a category, 
additional items were chosen from other categories if 
available based on the order outlined above. Otherwise, 
the questionnaire was executed with fewer items. 
 
5. Results  
 
In this section, we present the results of our study 
which are publicly available3. First, we discuss the 
participants’ demographics and data statistics. Subse-
quently, we outline the results of the previously pro-
posed research questions. 
 
5.1 Demographics and data statistics 
 
Demographics are presented in Table 1. Of 74 per-
sons taking part in the study, 68 data sets remained 
after cleansing erroneous or incomplete datasets. Of 
the 68 participants, females account for 38.24 % which 
leads to a slight male bias (61.76 %). The participants’ 
age ranges from 18 to 31 years (µ = 23.93; σ = 2.66). 
Compared to the age distribution on Facebook4, we 
observe an overrepresentation of the early- to mid-
twenties group, which can be attributed to the academ-
ic context of our study (95.59 % of the participants 
indicate to have an academic background). The majori-
ty of participants (64.71 %) reports to have neither 
professional- nor academic IT-related training.  
 
Table 1. Participant demographics 
Demographic variable Category Percent. 
Gender Female 38.24 % 
Male 61.76 % 
Age ≤ 20 4.41 % 
21-23 41.18 % 
24-26 41.18 % 
27-29 8.82 % 
≥ 30 4.41 % 
Academic Background yes 95.59 % 
no 4.41 % 
IT Background yes 35.29 % 
no 64.71 % 
 
In total we analyzed 924 items (567 in the active in-
formation sharing questionnaire (cf. Section 4.2.3) and 
357 in the past information availability questionnaire 
(cf. Section 4.2.4)) that can be distributed to the fol-
lowing five categories: 540 (58.44 %) status posts, 86 
(9.31 %) link posts, 53 (5.74 %) mobile-, 115 
(12.45 %) album-, and 130 (14.07 %) wall pictures.  
                                                 
3http://www-ifsresearch.wiwi.uni-regensburg.de/paper/HICSS/ 
4http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/, retrieved on May 
21, 2012 
Table 2. Privacy settings per object type (per-
centages, default settings shaded gray) 
  ME CU AF FF NF EV 
Status Post 0.0 12.2 34.7 2.5 0.2 3.0 
Link 0.0 2.8 8.1 0.2 0.0 1.1 
Mobile Pic. 0.0 3.0 4.6 0.4 0.2 1.2 
Album Pic. 0.0 3.5 8.6 0.7 0.0 1.6 
Wall Pic. 0.4 3.0 6.5 0.9 0.0 0.7 
ME = Me, CU= Custom subset of friends, AF = All friends,  
FF = Friends of friends, NF = Networks and friends, EV = Everyone 
 
Considering the participants’ actual privacy settings 
per item type as depicted in Table 2, it is notable that 
most items were shared with all contacts or a custom 
list of contacts, while only 7.6 % were shared using the 
default settings. This differs from a previous study’s 
results, stating that 36 % of items are shared using de-
fault settings [15] and might be due to regionally dif-
fering privacy attitudes [11] or increased awareness. 
 
5.2 Default Information Spreading 
 
This section discusses possible mismatches be-
tween perceived, preferred, and actual default visibility 
settings (cf. Section 3). First, we investigate the partic-
ipants’ expectations of default settings (RQ1a). 
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that for six 
out of ten data categories available on Facebook the 
highest percentage of participants correctly estimated 
the default visibility settings. This indicates a basic 
awareness of the default personal information flows on 
OSN. On average, 22.1 % (± 9.9 %)5 overestimated the 
default visibility settings. Overestimation is highest for 
data categories with restrictive default settings (such as 
Contact Info and Birthdate). It is notable that more 
than a third of the participants (AVG 37.6 % ± 11.5 %) 
expected the default settings to be more restrictive than 
the actual settings. However, we are aware that partici-
pants’ awareness might be distracted due to Face-
book’s frequent changes of their default settings which 
should be subject to further investigation. 
For seven of ten data categories, a higher percent-
age of participants underestimated the default visibility 
settings instead of overestimating them (see TOT BLW 
and TOT ABV in Table 3). The sign test (α = 0.05) 
confirms a strong significant lower median for partici-
pant estimated settings than for default settings, i.e. a 
significant underestimation, for the five data categories 
Name, Wall Posts, Profile Picture, Likes, and Other 
Profile Data. Furthermore, the sign test also approves a 
significant overestimation for the data categories Con-
tact Info, Gender, and Birthday. 
                                                 
5Subseq., confidence intervals are stated in brackets for α = 0.05 % 
Table 3. Expected default settings (percent-
ages, default settings shaded gray) 
  ME AF FF FB EV 
TOT  
BLW 
TOT  
ABV 
Cont. 27.9 19.1 19.1 23.5 10.3 27.9 52.9 
Name 2.9 4.4 7.4 16.2 69.1 30.9 0.0 
Wall 1.5 23.5 23.5 39.7 11.8 48.5 11.8 
Netw. 8.8 8.8 13.2 52.9 16.2 30.9 16.2 
Prof. Pic. 1.5 2.9 5.9 27.9 61.8 38.2 0.0 
Likes 2.9 19.1 19.1 39.7 19.1 80.9 0.0 
Frien. 4.4 8.8 16.2 50.0 20.6 29.4 20.6 
Gend. 2.9 5.9 4.4 41.2 45.6 13.2 45.6 
Birth. 1.5 17.7 19.1 41.2 20.6 19.1 61.8 
Other 5.9 25.0 26.5 30.9 11.8 57.4 11.8 
          AVG 37.6 22.1 
ME = Me, AF = All friends, FF = Friends of friends, NF = Networks 
and friends, EV = Everyone, TOT BLW = Total below default set-
ting, TOT ABV = Total above default setting 
 
Table 4. Preferred default settings (percent-
ages, default settings shaded gray) 
  ME AF FF FB EV 
TOT  
BLW 
TOT  
ABV 
Cont. 36.8 50.0 11.8 1.5 0.0 36.8 13.2 
Name 5.9 16.2 20.6 54.4 2.9 97.1 0.0 
Wall 4.4 85.3 8.8 1.5 0.0 98.5 0.0 
Netw. 13.2 44.1 32.4 10.3 0.0 89.7 0.0 
Prof. Pic. 2.9 25.0 35.3 33.8 2.9 97.1 0.0 
Likes 10.3 63.2 25.0 0.0 1.5 98.5 0.0 
Frien. 13.2 35.3 45.6 5.9 0.0 94.1 0.0 
Gend. 13.2 25.0 25.0 27.9 8.8 63.2 8.8 
Birth. 14.7 63.2 16.8 5.9 0.0 78.0 5.9 
Other 11.8 73.5 11.8 2.9 0.0 97.1 0.0 
          AVG 85.0 2.8 
ME = Me, AF = All friends, FF = Friends of friends, NF = Networks 
and friends, EV = Everyone, TOT BLW = Total below default set-
ting, TOT ABV = Total above default setting 
 
Subsequently, we investigate possible mismatches 
between actual and preferred default settings (RQ1b). 
Drawing from the results of Table 4, it can be in-
ferred that OSN users want privacy settings to be more 
restrictive (on average, 85.0 % (± 8.5 %) prefer more 
restrictive privacy settings) compared to the actual set-
tings. A standard sign test (α = 0.05) confirms for all 
ten data categories a strong significant preference of 
more restrictive settings. Nevertheless, it is notable that 
54.4% (± 11.8 %) wish that by default, their name 
should be accessible by all users. Hence, we deduce 
that while users want more restrictive defaults they 
also want to be found by other OSN users. Additional-
ly, it is notable that the desire for names to be public 
interferes with the wish for gender to be comparatively 
private, as gender can usually be deduced from a name. 
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Figure 5. False Positive and False Negative 
Rate for Expected and Preferred Visibility 
 
5.3 Active Information Sharing 
 
At first, we investigate whether the participants un-
derstood the implications of access control settings for 
their shared items, i.e. whether expected and actual 
visibility settings match (RQ2a).  
For 567 objects in total, participants provided their 
expected visibility setting for each of the 15 contacts 
displayed, resulting in 8505 visibility decisions. The 
results show that 82.1 % (± 0.8 %) of all assumed visi-
bility settings match with the actual settings which 
indicates that OSN users are in general well aware of 
their privacy settings. It is notable that this value in-
creases to 92.5 % (± 1.8 %) when focusing only on the 
visibility for complete strangers.  
The remaining 17.9 % (± 0.8 %) of all visibility de-
cisions are analyzed in detail, i.e. the cases in which 
the expected and actual settings do not match. Two 
types of errors can be distinguished (see Figure 5): A 
False Negative (FN) error occurs if the actual visibility 
of an item for a given contact is true while the partici-
pant assumes that the visibility is false, i.e. the partici-
pant underestimates the visibility. Similarly, a False 
Positive (FP) error occurs if the item is not visible for a 
given contact, while the participant thinks it is, i.e. the 
participant overestimates the visibility.  
First analyzing underestimation (EXP FN), we ob-
serve a negative connection to tie strengths. Starting 
with 1.2 % (± 0.5 %) for the Close Friends category the 
value increases to 6.4% (± 1.2 %) for Loose Acquaint-
ances. From this, we infer that participants are well 
aware which of their best friends have access to which 
parts of their profile, while they are less sure about 
people they rarely interact with. Regarding overestima-
tion (EXP FP) of visibility, it can be seen that overes-
timation ranges between 14.1 % (± 1.7 %) - 18.3 % (± 
1.8 %) for all visibility decisions in all contact catego-
ries, except for the Random Strangers (2.7 % ± 0.8 %), 
i.e. participants have no completely well-defined non-
visibility awareness for their contacts, yet they are well 
aware that shared items are not accessible by strangers. 
Using a standard binominal test, it can be shown that 
≥ 45 % of OSN users significantly underestimate the 
actual visibility settings for at least one of their items. 
Subsequently, we investigate possible discrepancies 
between preferred and actual visibility settings (RQ2b). 
Similar to the previous research question, we received 
8505 preferred visibility decisions that were compared 
with the actual visibility setting. Preferred and actual 
visibility setting matched in 75.4 % (± 0.9 %) of all 
cases. From this fact we deduce that OSN users largely 
set the visibility of shared items according to their 
preferences, i.e. they make use of the access control 
options provided by the OSN. 
Analyzing the mismatch between preferred and ac-
tual visibility settings (24.6 % ± 0.9 %), we observe 
that FP errors - the desired setting is less restrictive 
than the actual setting - range between 14.9 % (± 
1.7 %) - 17.6 % (± 1.8 %) for the first four contacts 
categories while it decreases to 2.2 % (± 0.7 %) for 
Random Strangers. Thus we observe that besides pure 
privacy considerations there are also several cases in 
which users actually prefer less restrictive disclosure 
settings. Hence, misconceptions about an access con-
trol model of an OSN do not exclusively relate to in-
formation oversharing. However, we add for consid-
eration that - for preserving privacy - instances of pre-
ferred looser disclosure settings do not outweigh cases 
where more restrictive visibility settings are preferred. 
Next, we analyze false negative (FN) errors, i.e. the 
preferred setting is to deny visibility for a given contact 
while in reality, access is granted. Similar to the previ-
ous research question RQ2a, demands for more restric-
tive settings is negatively connected to tie strength, 
starting from 3.2 % (± 0.8 %) for Close Friends to 
21.63 % (± 2.0 %) for Loose Acquaintances. From 
these results we deduce oversharing for contacts that 
are not in the user’s inner circle while settings are more 
likely to be correct for close friends. A binominal test 
proves significantly that ≥ 64 % of OSN users wish the 
actual visibility settings to be more restrictive for at 
least one of their items. 
In summary, comparing the results of RQ2a and 
RQ2b it is noteworthy, that FN error rates for RQ2b 
are higher than those of RQ2a, which is interpretable 
as the wish to further restrict visibility of shared items. 
 
5.4 Past information availability 
 
First, we analyze the users’ awareness of the persis-
tence of shared items (RQ3a). The study participants 
expressed their level of surprise for a total of 357 
items. With 86.3 % (± 3.6 %) the majority of items was 
no or only a little surprise, while 9.8 % (± 3.1 %) led to 
a surprised reaction (no opinion 3.9 % ± 2.07 %). If 
reasons for surprise were stated by the participants, 
lack of memorization accounted for 68.6 % (± 15.4 %), 
changes on personality for 28.6 % (± 15.0 %), and both 
for the rest. Relating to the 68 test participants instead 
of items, 29.4 % (± 9.6 %) of the participants were 
(very) surprised about at least one of their items. 
Note that the results for surprise should be inter-
preted as the lower bound. It cannot be ruled out that 
by showing an item the participant’s memory was re-
freshed leading to lower reported levels of surprise.  
Nevertheless, conclusions can be drawn from the 
results. The majority of OSN items shared at least a 
year ago are of no surprise for their creators. Still, a 
binominal test shows significantly that at least every 
fifth OSN user lacks awareness for the permanent 
availability of at least one shared item.  
Finally, we analyze preferred visibility changes 
(RQ3b). As can be seen in Table 5, of the total of 357 
items, participants prefer 9.5 % (± 3.0 %) to be deleted, 
27.2 % (± 4.6 %) to be restricted in their visibility and 
63.3 % (± 5.0 %) to be left unchanged. As a result, the 
users preferred more restrictive visibility settings for 
36.7 % (± 5.0 %) of the items. The probability of par-
ticipants choosing more restrictive visibility settings 
was 82.9 % (± 12.5 %) for surprising or very surprising 
items and 32.1 % (± 5.2 %) for non-surprising items. 
Considering the different item categories in Table 5 
in more detail, it is notable that no participant wanted 
to delete any album pictures while wishes for deletion 
were expressed for other categories especially when 
the participants were surprised. Relating to the 68 test 
participants instead of items, 57.4 % (± 11.8 %) want-
ed to limit the visibility of at least one item while 19.1 
% (± 9.4 %) even wanted to delete at least one item. 
These results suggest that OSN users demand to re-
duce the visibility of every third item that they shared 
at least one year ago. A binominal test proves signifi-
cantly that ≥ 46 % of OSN users would prefer to re-
strict the visibility of at least one of their items. There-
fore, it seems reasonable to suppose that the OSN users 
demand more aid and support to limit the visibility 
settings for older items. 
 
6. Research Limitations  
 
One can argue that a number of factors limit mak-
ing generalizations based on the study results: Our 
study solely relies on profile data of a single OSN, 
namely Facebook which we see however as the most 
representative at this time. The sample of this study 
was overrepresentative of early- to mid-twenty year old 
participants. Additional limitations comprise the re-
gional focus of participants, the academic background 
of the study and self-reported demographics. 
Table 5. User awareness of previously shared 
items and preferred action (percentages) 
  Action 
Status 
Posts Links 
Wall 
Pic. 
Abum 
Pic all 
All 
Items 
Delete 10.7 23.5 6.2 0.0 9.5 
Limit vis. 25.6 11.8 33.8 33.3 27.2 
Keep 63.6 64.7 60.0 66.7 63.3 
Surp. 
delete 42.3 66.7 50.0 0.0 40.0 
Limit vis. 42.3 0.0 50.0 75.0 42.9 
Keep 15.4 33.3 0.0 25.0 17.1 
Not 
surp.  
delete 7.2 7.7 5.1 0.0 6.2 
Limit vis. 24.2 15.4 33.9 27.6 26.0 
Keep 68.6 76.9 61.0 72.4 67.9 
 
Users with less than the required numbers of con-
tacts and profile items were excluded from participa-
tion, thus our results are only applicable to Facebook 
users with a level of activity on the platform that ex-
ceeds these criteria. It can be argued that those people 
fulfilling the requirements to participate might be more 
active on OSN and familiar with privacy settings than 
the average user, posing a threat to external validity. 
Also, the comparably small sample size limits statisti-
cal significance, though we argue that by opting for 
conducting the study in person, we achieved a better 
quality of responses compared to a remote survey. 
As noted in [15], privacy is hard to measure, which 
we alleviate to a certain extent by comparing and quan-
tifying disclosure settings. Still, putting these measures 
into statistical terms is not trivial. The audience set-
tings friends and everyone for instance differ in orders 
of magnitude and thus cannot be put on a metric scale. 
One can argue that compared to conventional sur-
veys, adapting the questionnaire to the participants’ 
Facebook profiles leads to issues of comparability be-
tween samples. While we acknowledge for instance 
that users who are more active on Facebook may be 
more challenged in managing their disclosure settings, 
we also assert that such differences would also occur 
when using a static survey, as such a survey is also 
dependent on the participants’ experiences on OSN. 
On the level of profile items, we argue that posing 
questions about real items yields more honest answers 
than asking about the general attitude towards privacy. 
 
7. Discussion and Implications  
 
 In the following, results are discussed based on our 
conceptualization of perceived, preferred, and actual 
visibility setting (see Figure 1). First, possible discrep-
ancies between perceived and actual visibility settings 
are investigated, indicating a lack of user awareness. 
Regarding default information flows, on the one hand a 
general awareness of default settings on OSN can be 
attested, yet on the other hand minor over- and stronger 
underestimation tendencies can be observed. Focusing 
on underestimation, which is statistically significant for 
five data categories (see Section 5.2), further investiga-
tion is required to identify root causes. Similar, our 
results for active information sharing show that per-
ceived and actual visibility settings match to a large 
extend, i.e. users are generally well aware of the visi-
bility of shared personal items to other users. Mis-
matches split to both over- and underestimation, while 
we significantly showed that almost every other user 
underestimates the visibility of at least one item. Like-
wise, regarding awareness of past information availa-
bility, participants’ perceived and actual visibility set-
tings matched in most cases. Yet, one in five partici-
pants significantly underestimates one or more items, 
which might be attributed to limited mental capacities 
or to a change in personality but needs to be further 
investigated in future work. 
Second, possible mismatches between preferred 
and actual visibility settings are discussed, indicating a 
lack of control (see Figure 1). Targeting default infor-
mation sharing, our study shows significantly for all 
data categories that users prefer more restrictive default 
visibility settings. Regarding shared items, our analysis 
shows a reasonable matching rate of preferred and ac-
tual visibility settings. Yet, it is statistically significant 
that 64% of users wish to reduce the visibility of at 
least one item. Regarding the users’ preferences of past 
information availability, results show that the preferred 
visibility setting is more restrictive than the actual visi-
bility for every third item and that significantly almost 
every other user wants to restrict visibility, indicating a 
strong demand for more control over older items. In 
summary, a gap has been identified between preferred 
and actual visibility settings which can be interpreted 
as the users’ demand for more control over shared 
items, yet being currently unable to accurately adjust 
the visibility according to their wishes. Additional re-
search is required to analyze whether this gap is due to 
a lack of available means to control visibility or due to 
difficulties in making use of the settings available. 
Discussing the results from a general point of view, 
fewer discrepancies between actual and either per-
ceived or preferred visibility settings exist than one 
might possibly expect but instead the settings often 
match. Yet, concluding that privacy threats stemming 
from other users are minor or do not exist at all would 
fall short. Rather, the crucial point here is to define the 
term privacy violation. In other words, to be regarded a 
privacy violation, how many shared items must be un-
intentionally visible to other users? We argue that no 
universally valid answer to this question exists, but it 
rather depends on the shared item and the people being 
able to see it. Thus, for this work, gaps between actual 
and either perceived or preferred visibility settings are 
regarded a potential violation of privacy.  
Additionally, it might be argued that a negative im-
pact on the results might stem from participants who, 
even if they are highly privacy-conscious, do not en-
gage in better privacy protection for various reasons 
(e.g. in cases where the privacy paradox applies). Yet, 
this does not influence our results, as the mismatch 
between perceived and preferred visibility is not inves-
tigated in this study. Instead, even if privacy-conscious 
people use loose visibility settings, they are firstly 
aware of these settings and secondly they intentionally 
defined the settings to be loose. 
From a theoretical point of view, this work contrib-
utes by providing a conceptual framework (see Fig-
ure 1) that decomposes privacy threats stemming from 
other OSN users to a lack of awareness and a lack of 
control. Hence, this conceptual model can be used to 
quantify and thereby operationalize privacy problems 
by reducing them to the difference between actual and 
either perceived or preferred visibility settings. To mit-
igate awareness problems, expected and actual settings 
need to become closer. Likewise, to overcome issues 
of insufficient control, one needs to equalize preferred 
and actual settings.  
Drawing from the results of this study, several the-
oretical and research implications can be deduced. It 
seems that social identity theory [9], which is common-
ly used to describe interaction between people in the 
physical world, cannot fully capture the problems of 
managing identities on OSN, due to inherent properties 
of mediated communication (e.g. persistence) and to 
limitations posed by SIdM tools provided by OSN ser-
vice providers. Hereunto, research could evolve by 
incorporating these inherent properties of OSN into 
social identity theory and thus facilitate the theoretical 
understanding of OSN privacy. For practical research 
implications, these inherent properties of OSN (such as 
digital availability) provide opportunities to improve 
on privacy, e.g. by developing automation techniques 
to assist the user in managing identities online. 
From a practical point of view, several implications 
emerge. While studies show [19] that OSN service 
providers have few incentives to improve default set-
tings, regulatory measures might be enacted to enforce 
implementation. For sharing decisions, a shift from 
traditional access control models to sharing along so-
cial contexts could help to close the gap between pre-
ferred and actual visibility settings, such as by dividing 
the platform into separate spaces. In addition, automa-
tion techniques, as proposed in [18, 20], could relieve 
the burden to define the audience every time an item is 
shared. Besides legal and technical solutions, better 
education of OSN users could also help to reduce exist-
ing discrepancies. 
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